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Abstract 
In the nineteenth century, it was not only merchants from British India who participated in the 
expanding trade with China, but also those from the princely states who sought to profit from the 
increased demand for cash crops. Smuggling – as most commercial activities unsanctioned by the 
Bombay Government were labelled – was a source of great anxiety for the colonial authorities in India, 
especially in the western territories. This article looks at smuggling activity in and around the Bombay 
Presidency during the first half of the nineteenth century. It will assert that local ‘smuggling’ was, in 
many cases, the continuation of pre-colonial trade relations, labelled as illegal as a result of ill-defined 
boundaries and ambiguous legal restrictions. In fact, the success of these activities was less a 
reflection of widespread criminality than structural weaknesses in the colonial administration. Evidence 
suggests that British anxieties over smuggling had a greater effect on the political economy of western 
India than the actual financial damage caused by the illicit trade. The coordinated subversive 
smuggling network, ultimately, did not exist, and held power largely as a figment of the imperial 
imagination. 
 
 
Smuggling as a concept is deeply entrenched within contemporary scholarship. The term is defined as 
trade activity that is illicit or unsanctioned by government. It is therefore used to describe a wide range 
of activities, from evading taxes or duties to using covert means to move goods across borders. 
Colloquially, the term often denotes deliberately criminal activity, such as drug or arms smuggling. It is 
this very association, however, that tends to colour the way that scholarship has described smuggling 
in nineteenth century India, as activities designed to undermine colonial authority or subvert British 
rule. 
Over the last decade, an increasing amount of scholarship has emerged to directly consider 
the opium trade in western India, especially as it arose as a chiefly Indian enterprise, in contrast to the 
British-managed Bengal trade in the East. Amar Farooqui in particular has published several books 
and articles on the opium trade, but he has been joined by others such as John F. Richards and 
Claude Markovits who have considered the contribution of opium to the finances of British India, as 
well as the impact that the trade had on the political economy of the western region.1 While smuggling 
certainly held a place in this conversation – with Farooqui and Markovits addressing it the most 
directly – it was largely mentioned as only a part of a larger discussion of the opium trade and, in most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A. Farooqui, Smuggling as Subversion: Colonialism, Indian Merchants, and the Politics of Opium, (New Delhi: New Age 
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cases, as a precursor to the regulated Bombay trade of the nineteenth century. Those who chose to 
examine smuggling more directly have accordingly represented it as a subversive enterprise. Farooqui 
proposes that the eighteenth century Malwa opium trade was fundamentally destabilising as it 
undermined the East India Company’s monopoly. He subsequently emphasises the often-
confrontational relationship between Indian capital and colonial authority as Malwa opium assumed a 
place of prominence within the western Indian economy.  This interpretation underlines the 
transformative qualities of the opium trade for the political economy of western India. However, while 
in certain sectors this might certainly have been the case – namely in relation to mainstream 
enterprise – it is an approach that neglects the impact of smaller, local business activities on the 
region. 2 Moreover, the argument that Malwa opium was inherently subversive applies less well to the 
latter decades of the nineteenth century, after the trade was absorbed into the colonial revenue 
structure. This critique was addressed somewhat in Claude Markovits’s 2009 article on the political 
economy of opium smuggling, in which he considers opium smuggling to be more the result of 
opportunism and ‘residual leakage’ than a systematic effort to undermine the colonial regime.3 While 
useful in that it raises questions that problematise traditional smuggling narratives, it remains focused 
on opium as the commodity in question. By incorporating the traffic in other commodities into this 
story, this article offers insight into systematic continuities that played a role in the persistence of 
certain forms of supposedly illicit trade into the British period.  
This article thus seeks to bridge these gaps in two main ways: first, it will develop Farooqui’s 
argument and, ultimately, suggest that though it had relevance during the earlier period, by the 
nineteenth century the character of the Malwa opium trade had changed to such an extent that his 
argument no longer holds true. This article therefore aims to dissect the relationship between Indian 
enterprise and colonial policy during the years between 1818 and 1870. Second, it will differentiate the 
‘legitimate’ enterprise largely found in Bombay from the illicit trade conducted elsewhere in the region, 
while also highlighting the ambiguities present in making such distinctions. Ultimately, it is these very 
ambiguities that provide a place from which to appraise the nature of western India’s illicit trade. The 
roots of such activity in the pre-colonial period, coupled with case studies from a number of Gujarati 
smuggling cases in the 1840s and 1850s, provide a basis for assessing the parameters that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Farooqui. Smuggling as Subversion, pp. 4-6. 
3 Markovits, pp. 101-102. 
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determined an enterprise’s legality or illegality, and elucidating the wider impact of illegal trading 
activities and what they meant for the state of colonial administration in the region. 
Smuggling in nineteenth-century India was not simply a subversive practice that grew in 
response to colonialism, but rather formed part of a longer-standing tradition of Indian trade. 
Smugglers as well as legitimate Indian traders were able to operate successfully under an intrusive 
colonial regime due to the solid foundation developed over centuries of participation in overseas trade. 
While the opium trade and the expansion of the Chinese market heralded an explosion of wealth and 
opportunity, the big Bombay firms, as well as small-scale merchant companies, were not developing 
business practices from scratch, but rather were adapting and building upon existing systems. The 
new opportunities that emerged over the course of the nineteenth century inspired a redirection of pre-
existing systems. The adaptation, diversification and reorientation that occurred during this period 
were themselves part of a deeply entrenched methodology for survival and success in the global 
marketplace. Furthermore, the employment by colonial officials of the term ‘smuggling’ to denote such 
activity is in itself significant, as it is suggestive of the attitudes that existed with regard to independent 
Indian enterprise. Perceptions of the risk posed by smugglers to the income of the British Raj played a 
discernible role in the construction of colonial administrative structures in the region, as well as helping 
to shape political alliances and territorial annexations within the realm of the Bombay Presidency. 
 
PRE-COLONIAL NETWORKS 
It is impossible to exclude opium from any conversation about smuggling in India; opium was, without 
question, the country’s single most profitable commodity of the nineteenth century. The sheer volume 
of opium being produced and the amount of money at stake made it simultaneously easy and 
attractive for smugglers to acquire, as well as a highly-regulated product facing extreme government 
scrutiny. However, smuggling methods were not used solely for opium. They were also used to 
convey other commodities, such as salt, timber, and sugar. Salt, in particular, became a point of 
considerable tension between Gujarati manufacturers and the British authorities.4 
 Though the period under scrutiny here was dominated by the rise of Bombay, in earlier years 
trade had been distributed amongst a number of ports along the coast. Karachi in the north, as well as 
Surat, Cambay and Broach in Gujarat, and Dabhol further south all played host to high volumes of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Residency Reports of the Kaira Collectorate, Political Department, Maharashtra State Archives, (1832-1870). 
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exports. Particularly during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries overseas trade was largely 
directed toward the Red Sea and Indian Ocean spheres, with some traders travelling further abroad to 
Zanzibar and other locations in east Africa.5 The coasting trade – which travelled from port to port 
along India’s vast seaboard – was also highly lucrative in this period and was generally considered the 
most expedient means of conveying goods from western India to Bengal and the Coromandel Coast. 
Goods sent eastwards in this manner were either consumed domestically or, as was often the case, 
re-exported to markets further afield in Southeast Asia.  
 Catering to such a large number of active seaports required an intricate system of overland 
supply routes. These were typically dominated by communities with a long history of commerce in 
their vicinity. For example, opium was chiefly grown in the central provinces, though fields also existed 
in the north, in Punjab and the Rajput States. Bohras from Gujarat dominated much of this trade. 
Particularly in the Rajput states, it was often easier for resident groups operating with the support of 
the local ruler to acquire rights to purchase and transport goods. They would thus obtain opium and 
transport it to a regional bazaar. Ujjain was one of the main commercial centres from which the Bohras 
operated, so from this point they would procure the drug and transport it to Burnhanpur for distribution 
to the coast. Alternatively, it was sometimes shipped directly from Malwa to Burnhanpur.6 Hyderabad 
in Sindh, as well as Jodhpur and Jaisalmer, were major points of convergence for overland opium 
dealers, who often carried the drug across borders on camelback. These routes, and this technique of 
transporting the drug through desert regions using camels, remained in use throughout the colonial 
period. 
Trade in other products followed similar routes or travelled along major waterways. Salt was a 
major commodity in Gujarat. The Maratha Peshwa and his local subordinates, such as the Gaekwars, 
constructed commercial salt works along the banks of the Mahi and Tapti river estuaries. The Nawab 
of Cambay similarly controlled salt works around the Gulf of Cambay. Products from these works were 
sent to Surat and Cambay for overseas shipment, or to Burnhampur for domestic distribution. 
Regionally, salt was also often moved by caravans of carts, though this was more dangerous as 
certain roads were impassable or were frequented by robbers. Regional salt traders, however, found 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 E. Eastwick. Murray’s Hand-Book for India; being an account of The Three Presidencies, and of The Overland Route; 
intended as A Guide for Travellers, Officers, and Civilians; with vocabularies and dialogues of the spoken language of India, 
Part II: Bombay, (London: John Murray, 1859). 
6 Farooqui, p. 111; Markovits, p. 93. 
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safer routes for moving salt, avoiding popular roadways in favour of short hops from village to village 
through wooded areas. These routes, which overcame the need to travel on long stretches of exposed 
road, remained in common use among citizens of this region into the nineteenth century, while 
European and Bombay merchants typically used main roads and later, the railways. 
The Portuguese also maintained a foothold in western India through much of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Even after their strength in the region began to decline, they still remained 
influential and, ultimately, their trading activities would help to construct the framework for smuggling 
under the British. The Portuguese relied heavily on the Gujarati merchant population, capitalising on 
the position held by these traders within the Red Sea and Indian Ocean Trades.7  Gujaratis were also 
able to leverage their community ties for both their own advantage and that of their European partners. 
Bania networks were particularly strong; by the 1700s, members of this community had established a 
thriving base in Gujarat’s main seaports, while their associates operated from ports all over the 
Persian Gulf and Red Sea regions. Through the employment of Bania agents the Portuguese were 
able to gain access to a greater number of markets, including those such as Aden – which at the time 
was administered by Ottoman Turkey – where they themselves would not have been welcomed. 
Meanwhile, Portuguese financing supported Bania enterprise and enabled them to continue to expand 
business for their own interests.8  
This relationship is indicative of the general processes of cooperation and adaptation practiced 
by the western Indian business classes. Many firms were short-lived, surviving through only one or 
two generations, and ultimately folding under the pressures of changing circumstances. Those that 
survived often did so thanks to an ability to develop mutually beneficial links with foreign traders and 
overseas markets,9 a tactic that had been practiced for centuries to maintain commercial links with 
wider Asian markets and Persian traders. Members of migrant groups, such as the Parsis and later, 
Baghdadi Jews, also maintained close relationships with those in their homeland with whom they 
fostered commercial ties. The example of the Portuguese demonstrates how this practice was applied 
to European Companies and is notable in that the adaptations developed at this time remained in use 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 M.N Pearson, Coastal Western India: Studies from the Portuguese Records, (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 
1981); M.N. Pearson, “Goa-Based Seaborne Trade, 17th-18th Centuries,” in Teotonio R. De Souza (ed), Goa Through the 
Ages, vol. II: An Economic History, (Goa: Goa University, 1990): pp. 146-175. 
8 O. Prakash, “The Indian Maritime Merchant, 1500-1800,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 47, 3, 
(2004): p. 437. 
9 G. A. Nadri, “The Maritime Merchants of Surat: A Long-Term Perspective,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of 
the Orient, vol. 50, 2/3: Spacial and Temporal Continuities of Merchant Networks in South Asia and the Indian Ocean (2007): 
pp. 235-258. 
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after the arrival of the British. Moreover, this earlier relationship with the Portuguese was integral to 
the establishment of the physical foundations for the eighteenth-and-nineteenth-century illicit traffic in 
China Market goods. In the sixteenth century, the trade most valued by the Portuguese was that 
conducted along India’s western coast, between Goa and the main ports of Gujarat, especially 
Cambay, but with stops along the way at Chaul, Bassein, Damaun and Surat. At this time the value of 
the trade with Gujarat surpassed even that with Portugal itself, being valued at well in excess of 
40,00,000 Rupees per year.10 Indian merchants facilitated Portuguese trade with Gujarat, maintaining 
a presence in the region’s key ports and providing access to local commodities, such as salt, cotton, 
home manufactured textiles, and timber. 
As the physical Portuguese presence in India diminished, ultimately replaced in many respects 
by the English East India Company, the mercantile communities with which they traded continued their 
operations relatively unabated. Despite widespread, ingrained inequality and racism within the 
European colonial structure, Indian merchants - particularly those from Gujarat – held a central 
position within the mercantile framework. The Portuguese trade is indicative of the general condition of 
seaborne commerce at the time that the British cemented their power in western India with a military 
victory over the Marathas in 1818. 
To understand the dynamics of nineteenth-century smuggling in western India, it is important to 
consider this earlier phase, as it was a key precedent with respect to the evolution of mercantile 
communities over the course of the colonial period. The established reputation of Gujaratis as the 
dominant commercial group in the region survived the ebbing of local Portuguese power. Indeed, the 
relationship between Gujarati merchants and the Portuguese continued long after the British began 
enforcing their own monopolies, with Portuguese ports playing a crucial role in the circumvention of 
British authority and acting as key gateways for independent Indian exports. Furthermore, the history 
of building cooperative partnerships with colonising or foreign powers in order to facilitate trade, 
together with the persistence of pre-European commercial hierarchies, greatly influenced the volume 
of smuggling under British colonialism. 
 
DIVIDING COMMUNITIES 
In due course, the intervention of European powers served to divide western India’s mercantile 	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community into two main groups: those who operated within the framework of British India and those 
who kept their activities largely separate, although the latter group included those who worked instead 
within the parameters established by various local native states. These merchants often became the 
focal point of policy disagreements between these princely states and the Bombay Presidency; since 
they operated principally in accordance with the laws of their own state, if an area or policy was under 
dispute they could end up simultaneously violating colonial law. 
 The character of mercantile enterprise also varied significantly between so-called ‘legitimate’ 
traders and independent merchants.11 Most obvious were locational differences; those who operated 
within the boundaries of British colonial law conducted business chiefly out of British ports, particularly 
Bombay, whereas independent traders used ports maintained by one of the native states or the 
Portuguese.  Legitimate traders also used mainly monitored modes of transportation, such as the 
railway network, which stopped at colonial observation points such as Bombay, Ahmedabad and 
Indore. 
 The most unique aspects of legitimate overseas trade, when compared with unsanctioned 
businesses, were the ways in which such firms were constructed and how they developed 
relationships. Most notable within the regulated trade were the Bombay-based firms, which 
established diversified portfolios and shareholder groups, allowing their owners to accumulate 
massive personal wealth. They developed cooperative relationships not only with each other but also 
with European firms. The Parsi firm, Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy Sons & Co., for example, had a long-
standing partnership with the British firm, Jardine Matheson & Co. Jeejeebhoy Sons & Co. acquired 
goods that were then licensed to their European partners for sale in China and throughout Southeast 
Asia.12 Such arrangements were beneficial to both parties; in this case, the Jeejeebhoy-Jardine 
Matheson partnership provided the Parsi firm with access to broader sales channels in East Asia, 
while their British partners received superior supply avenues in the subcontinent. Such relationships, 
and the ability to capitalise on the widening, increasingly globalised economic sphere of the British 
Empire, were notable benefits of operating within the purview of colonial law. 
 Meanwhile, those trading outside the colonial sphere operated in a very different world. Such 
merchants often sold goods on a much smaller scale, either as independent businessmen or as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For the sake of clarity, merchants operating within colonial law shall, from here on, be referred to as legitimate traders (in 
contrast with illicit or independent merchants). 
12 Jardine Matheson Papers, University of Cambridge Library. 
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localised family firms. Furthermore, since merchants were required to pay port duties to the 
government of that area in which they operated, many small-scale traders opted instead to ship goods 
from small inlets, avoiding the regulations and duties associated with official ports. Alternatively, they 
would ship goods down the coast to the Portuguese ports of Damaun and Diu, where they paid only 
minimal export duties and escaped entirely the watchful eye of the British East India Company. There 
are particularly frequent accounts of this practice being pursued by traders from Kutch, who evaded 
tariffs and export restrictions by utilising the port of Damaun to export products to China.13  
 However, despite operating in fairly separate spheres, legitimate and illicit modes of mercantile 
enterprise were inextricably linked, held together through financial bonds and a shared history. Like 
their corporate counterparts, independent traders diversified their businesses, selling a variety of 
different goods. Although opium became a point of particular focus, given the lucrative nature of the 
trade, it was not the only product moved by these groups. Typically, those engaged in opium 
smuggling also evaded restrictions on the transport of commodities such as cotton, indigo and salt.14 
Moreover, their business also included shipment of legal commodities such as silk textiles, chintzes, 
and various other piece goods. In both cases, firms were built on foundations of kinship and 
developed from long-standing regional and overseas ties.15 While those in Bombay often transcended 
the boundaries of traditional kinship groups to develop intercommunal links necessitated by the 
expanding scope of their investments, they were often – at least originally – outgrowths of pre-colonial 
businesses. Such firms did expand eventually into other sectors and through their ties with other 
Indian and European communities built large-scale, diversified, companies, but many began with a 
foundation in traditional community professions such as middlemen and moneylenders.16 For instance, 
some of the earliest Parsi migrants to Bombay, such as the Rustumji family from Surat, began as 
agents to the European Companies in Gujarat before seeking greater success in Bombay.17  
 This habit of crossing communal lines, though a clear departure from older business models, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Secretary to the Government of Bombay to the Resident in Kutch, Revenue Department, Maharashtra State Archives, (23 
November 1821). 
14 Anonymous, “Miscellaneous of 1852,” India Separate Revenue Department, India Office Collection, British Library, 
(Bombay: 20 August, 1852). 
15 C. Dobbin. Urban Leadership in Western India: Politics and Communities in Bombay City, 1840-1885, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1972): pp. 3-17; P. Chopra. A Joint Enterprise: Indian Elites and the Making of British Bombay, 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2011): pp. xii-xxii. 
16 Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy to Donald Matheson, Private Papers: Bombay 1838-59, Jardine Matheson Papers, (Bombay: 27 
March, 1848). 
17 A. Das Gupta, “The Merchants of Surat, c. 1700-1750,” in Uma Das Gupta (ed). The World of the Indian Ocean Merchant, 
1500-1800: Collected Essays of Ashin Das Gupta, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001): pp. 315-341. 
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was not entirely restricted to Bombay firms. Just as ‘legitimate’ traders in Bombay adapted their 
practices to the needs of larger-scale foreign trade, so too did independent traders in other parts of 
western India.18 In Gujarat, for example, it was primarily Muslim firms that owned ships and dominated 
the majority of overseas shipping. Konkan Muslims in particular gained a reputation as the foremost 
Indian Ocean traders in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, even managing to maintain this 
position of superiority after the arrival of the Portuguese.19 Other groups engaged in overseas trade by 
leasing space for their goods on Muslim ships. Through such arrangements, these firms were able to 
sell considerable quantities of goods overseas without needing to travel or own ships. The emergence 
of such practices before Europeans arrived in India suggests that the talent for adaptation exhibited by 
groups such as the Parsis in Bombay was not a result of European intervention, but rather one that 
emerged organically within the region. Moreover, such continuities both within the Bombay Presidency 
and in the native states further complicate the lines devised as a means of differentiating between 
‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ trade. 
 
SMALL-SCALE SMUGGLING 
Activity identified as smuggling was exceptionally prevalent in Gujarat over the course of the 
nineteenth century. The illicit trade was brought to the forefront of the colonial imagination following 
the 1818 Maratha defeat, as a result of increased market regulation associated with the consolidation 
of British authority in Bombay. At this time, the British leveraged their newly enhanced political 
foothold in the region to exert greater influence over the flow of goods into and around Bombay. 
Regulated goods were consistently transported without approval across the new boundaries between 
colonial territories and native states. Although smuggling practices varied in scale and character, 
perhaps most significant in this particular region were activities that were carried out locally. Small-
scale smuggling was widespread and became virtually endemic to the regional economy; even if 
individual incidents were chiefly minor, together they posed a significant threat to Government profits. 
The environmental landscape of Gujarat was, in large part, responsible for fostering the 
region’s successful smuggling culture. Roads were particularly dangerous; many were not even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 C.A. Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion 1770-1870, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997). 
19 R. Kanta Ray, “Asian Capital in the Age of European Domination: The Rise of the Bazaar, 1800-1914,” Asian Studies, 29, 
3, (1995): pp. 449-554. 
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equipped for carts, rendering them unfit for commercial use. They were also frequented by bands of 
thieves who, often violently, would divest travellers of their valuables. The British addressed this 
problem in part through the construction of railway networks that not only bypassed roads and crossed 
state boundaries without requiring payment of the myriad transit duties. Instead, the railways 
connected British-held cities such as Bombay and Ahmedabad where cargoes could be closely 
monitored and administrative charges attached.  Yet, it was this very outlay and heavy regulation that 
often deterred traders. Furthermore, routing goods through British-controlled cities often meant having 
to ship via long, out-of-the-way routes and incurring significant unnecessary expense for those 
conducting business on a smaller scale, or within a limited region, railways were impractical. 
Moreover, Gujarat had a deeply entrenched commercial economy that long preceded the 
imposition of colonialism and the trade regulations that accompanied it. This was a culture of 
commerce; intricate networks of supply, production, and sales preceded the arrival of European 
Companies, as did the tradition of adaptation, which in the nineteenth century allowed so many of 
these structures to persist. The western Indian economy had evolved over the centuries in a climate of 
constantly shifting political conditions and with input from foreign settlers and merchants. While the 
political landscape of the region had been repeatedly remodeled by outside influences – the 
Portuguese, Marathas and Mughals were a few notable entities who impacted the region over the 
centuries preceding the arrival of the British – the commercial culture remained, affected but not 
diminished by such political machinations. Largely, the ability of Gujarat’s commercial economy to 
withstand political pressures was the result of business conducted on a local level. In the nineteenth 
century, though large-scale mercantile enterprise was substantially transformed to suit the conditions 
of British rule and the widening Chinese market, small-scale trade existed much as it had done for 
many years. Home manufacturing and agricultural enterprise persisted, as did the artisanal production 
of goods for export.20 For example, in Cambay, the Kunbi traders had for centuries engaged in the 
home manufacture of cornelians. In 1839, the Collector of Kaira reported that the community was still 
heavily engaged in the practice, despite attempts by both the Nawab and the East India Company to 
restrict the practice through the imposition of 40 rupee fines on any who persisted.21 Rural families 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 D. Haynes. Small Town Capitalism in Western India: Artisans, Merchants, and the Making of the Informal Economy, 1870-
1960, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
21 W. Edwards. “Cambay Precis,” Political Department, Maharashtra State Archives, (Fort William: 9 September, 1843): p. 
130-131. 
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also continued to produce their own essential goods while also managing small plots of cash crops 
intended for local sale.22 Despite the colonial government restricting much of this activity – especially 
that connected with the production and sale of opium, cotton, and salt – it largely continued 
unabated.23 Both legal and illicit goods of all kinds were still bought and sold in the bazaars. Though 
mercantile networks were, to a degree, reoriented toward the production of goods for the China 
market, the old connections between cultivators, merchants, moneylenders, and consumers remained 
intact. These persistent links, which had long sustained Gujarat’s commercial economy, were now 
viewed by the colonial government as criminal efforts to evade their authority. It was this reimagining 
of commercial enterprise in western India, as well as its capacity to simultaneously retain its essential 
character and adapt to surrounding circumstances, that characterised smuggling in this period. 
Kathiawar in particular emerged as a breeding ground for smuggling. Close to the coast and 
major waterways, it was very easy to transport goods through this region for overseas export. Rife with 
networks of off-road trading routes and, more importantly, a large number of creeks and backwaters 
covering an area of around 350 square miles, this terrain was exceptionally suitable for support illegal 
commercial activities.24 Both opium and salt were smuggled extensively in this region with little risk of 
detection. These goods were easily moved domestically or transported into Cutch, where many 
vessels were ready to carry the product on to Africa, Bombay, Calcutta, or China. The coastal 
backwaters of Kathiawar also served the black market trade in opium grown further north. Opium 
cultivation was widespread across the northern territories, with vast quantities of the drug produced in 
the Punjab, Sindh, Rajasthan, and as far to the east as the independent state of Kashmir. The frontier 
territories were particularly productive, as the local colonial administration was ill-equipped to curtail 
such activity. Opium was often carried overland from those regions into western Asia. However, drug 
intended for East Asia was transported by way of the Gujarati coast; opium was carried on camels 
across Kathiawar's borders, then shifted to boats for transport through the backwaters to the coast. 
Local manufacturing and land-based modes of transport were integral to the perpetuation of 
the illicit trade. Off-road transport routes were used frequently for moving opium between cultivation 
grounds and nearby villages, or between different territories belonging to the same state. While 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid. 
23 A.D. Robertson to A. Malet, “Application from Bomanji Hormusji, for permission to construct a Salt Warehouse,” Revenue 
Department, Maharashtra State Archives, (Tanna: 10 August, 1853); Pamchunder Manoher Sheelotree, “The humble petition 
of naro Pamchunder Manoher Sheelotree at the Village of Penn,” Revenue Department, Maharashtra State Archives, (1860). 
24 A.D. Robertson to E.W. Ravenscroft, “Smuggling in Scinde,” Revenue Department, Maharashtra State Archives, (1868). 
	   12	  
traversing boundaries was universally highly regulated, domestic policies with regard to commerce 
varied greatly from territory to territory. In Kathiawar, for example, the domestic cultivation and sale of 
opium was forbidden (though far from nonexistent). Meanwhile, the Baroda territories retained rights to 
the production of their own opium, provided it was solely for domestic consumption. This did not mean, 
however, that no Baroda opium ever left its lands; on the contrary, opium flowed regularly from Baroda 
into neighbouring territories, where it significantly undercut government sales with far lower prices.  
The Umreily district of Kathiawar and the Pitlad territories of Baroda were both notorious for 
openly cultivating the drug without permission from the local customs agent or any payment of 
fees. While the production of opium in Pitlad was legal, as long as the product was for consumption 
within the boundaries of Baroda, it was forbidden in Umreily. Such bans, however, did little to curtail 
production. The growth of opium in Umreily was openly acknowledged, but was so widespread that it 
was impossible to suppress. The soil itself was conducive to the growth of opium. Many residents of 
Umreily grew their own opium in small patches; others could easily acquire the drug in the village 
market at a price far lower than that charged by the official sales depots. In Kathiawar, the extent of 
home production was so great that the government depots had trouble selling their own product. This 
may be largely attributed to the cost differential: in 1851, the Chief of Rajcote reported that 
government opium was sold at a price of 9 to 11 Rupees per seer, while the drug was found 
elsewhere at a mere 5 Rupees per seer. He further pointed out that no one even wanted to purchase 
a license to sell government opium as it was so difficult to offload.25 Though the local Chiefs were 
repeatedly asked to curtail the illegal trade and were heavily criticised for failing to do so, the 
difference in price remained a problem in convincing residents to purchase legal product. 26 
Furthermore, the ease and low cost with which opium could be produced independently meant that it 
was nearly impossible to prevent it being illicitly cultivated, especially with such a receptive consumer 
market. 
All such home manufacturing was counted within regional smuggling statistics and involved the 
widespread production of salt in addition to opium cultivation. Salt was aggressively regulated as part 
of the colonial export scheme in the middle decades of the nineteenth century only after the opium 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Jareja Mehramimji to Major W. Lang, “Opium Prices in Katteewar,” Revenue Department, Maharashtra State Archives, 
(1850). 
26 The Political Agent in Kathiawar to A. Malet, “Opium seizures in Katteewar,” Political Department, Maharashtra State 
Archives, (1 January, 1851). 
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trade began to decline. It became a major source of revenue for the Bombay Presidency by the mid-
1850s. For the year 1855-56 it raised more than £244,000, making it the fourth largest source of 
revenue for that year, after land revenue, opium, and customs duties.27 It remained in fourth position in 
large part due to the continued difficulty inherent in transitioning from a largely independent enterprise, 
which included local production and the home manufacture of coarse quality salt, to a centralised, 
highly regulated economy., Several native rulers already had established saltpans in their states that 
produced higher quality salt for domestic sale and foreign export and were naturally unhappy with the 
prospect of having this source of revenue commandeered by the colonial authorities.  
Salt’s position as one of the necessities for life, as well as the ease with which it could be 
produced in Gujarat, meant that home manufacturing of the coarser varieties was virtually an 
institution there. Meanwhile, production of higher quality versions was a major component of the 
economies of several native states. Efforts made by the Bombay Presidency to impose restrictions on 
salt manufacturing were almost entirely futile from the outset. One colonial officer termed the response 
to salt regulations within these territories as a "systematic defiance...of our preventive rules relative to 
salt smuggling".28   
The extension of British exclusivity rights to include the production of salt swiftly became a 
major point of contention between colonial authorities and local merchants and rulers. Besides cutting 
off ready access to a major source of income for this region, restrictions also barred residents from 
acquiring salt easily and cheaply. The Gaekwar himself argued against the claim, made under the 
Treaty of Bassein, stating that his entitlement to manufacture salt was protected by his sovereign right 
to “improve his own resources and his own territory in any manner not forbidden by Treaty” while 
denying that any British rights to salt production had been inherited from the Peshwa. In 1861, His 
Highness the Gaekwar, Khaskhel Shumshair Bahadoor, filed a formal petition to the Government of 
Bombay. In this, he argued: 
It may be observed that by the Treaties concluded between the Peshwa and the British 
Government, all the rights in Gujarat belonging to the former they have passed to the latter, but 
this does not affect the question or in any way diminish the right of this Government to make salt 
pans in its own territories… moreover, in the Agreements between the Peshwa and this 
Government in A.D. 1751-52 and 1753, regarding the partition of the districts in Gujarat, that they 
may be conjointly managed and their Revenue equally shared, from which it is clearly evident that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 “Salt,” Revenue Department, (1859). 
28 "Crown Representative Records, Baroda," India Office Collection, British Library, (8 July 1874). 
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the Peshwa recognised the right of this Government to make salt pans among other similar 
Privileges.29 
In this letter the Gaekwar asserted his sovereignty over the economic prosperity of his lands and, 
more importantly, denied the right of the Raj to claim profits from the internal commercial activities of 
the territory or to determine the course of actions taken. This argument is indicative of the general 
political tumult in the wake of 1857 and the subsequent transfer of power from the East India 
Company to the Raj. The Gaekwar’s opposition to the British salt monopoly concerned not only the 
potential profits from that particular enterprise, but equally the implied threat to his autonomy. 
In that same year, the Gaekwar himself constructed salt works near the village of Dubka – a 
site that had frequently housed saltpans – to create salt by evaporating seawater brought up into the 
channel of the Mahi River. There is no evidence that this production ever halted, even after reception 
of an explicit prohibition of such activity by the Government of Bombay. In fact, we see exactly the 
opposite with production continuing and even increasing.  
The Gaekwar also opposed such prohibitions in a more passive manner, by refusing to pass 
laws or issue orders to crack down on independent salt production amongst his citizens. His local 
Durbars were similarly resistant. As one British agent reported, “in matters of salt smuggling… they 
manifested perfect indifference as is evident by the fact that generally speaking they have themselves 
never effected a simple seizure, at best for the last twelve years, though their districts are a nursery for 
that crime.”30 In fact, not only did they generally refuse to help control independent salt production, but 
actually aided those culpable, often meeting colonial officials with outright hostility, offering, as one 
Baroda Resident noted, “obstruction to the officers of the British Government in the prevention and 
detection” of smuggling.31 In one such incident, the Customs Agent at Cutch reported that when his 
Assistant “met the Fruzdar and some of their officers of the Gaekwar, [they] not only refused to give up 
the smugglers and their salt, but paired their refusal with the utmost malevolence of manner.”32 The 
Durbars based in the districts of Korraj, Paloma and Kuddee were particularly guilty of this refusal to 
cooperate, with incidents of non-compliance recorded with the most frequency and greatest ferocity. 
As in the case of the salt industry, cotton cultivation and the production of textiles were both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Maharaja Khunderow Guikwar sena Khaskhel Shumshair Bahadoor to the Government of Bombay, “Yad on the subject of 
salt production in the Baroda Territories,” Crown Representative Records, India Office Collection, British Library, (26 
September, 1861). 
30 "Illegal Manufacture of Salt in Gaekwar's Territory," Crown Representative Records, India Office Records, British Library 
(1874). 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
	   15	  
long-standing and profitable industries in Gujarat. In particular, with industrialisation and the growth of 
Bombay factories in the 1850s, the British authorities in Bombay expended considerable effort in 
attempting to suppress competition from Gujarati cottage industries. While successful in curtailing 
many of the latter's exports, particularly from the regulated ports of Broach and Cambay, they were 
unable to eliminate entirely these village weaving centres. Much of the domestic trade in textiles 
continued to be supplied by local home manufacturers. These local weaving centres and small-scale 
cotton cultivators were all likewise counted amongst the networks of regional smugglers and were 
considered by some to be highly subversive of Bombay Presidency interests.  Similar responses were 
consequently received in response to efforts to control the trade in cotton. In the Sucheen Territory in 
the vicinity of Surat and Broach, smuggled cotton was supposedly landed frequently on its way down 
the coast. Despite repeated requests from the Government in Bombay for intervention, the Nawab of 
Sucheen repeatedly refused to intervene or, more accurately, simply chose not to intervene. 
Regardless of whether this inaction resulted from a lack of resources or an obstinate refusal to curtail 
the activity, it is clear that his citizens and his own coffers continued to benefit from the illegal landing 
of these boats.33 
While such activity may certainly be viewed as subversive in nature – and in many ways it 
undoubtedly was, particularly in cases of hostile non-compliance – it must also be viewed as an effort 
to protect the autonomy of Native States and to preserve existing avenues of production and trade. It 
is not surprising that colonial efforts to impose restrictions on pre-colonial, entrenched manufacturing 
sectors were met with great resistance. Rulers saw such laws as a challenge to their own profits and 
economic autonomy; local residents were uninspired to comply when they could produce the goods 
themselves with greater ease and far less cost. Given the difficulties inherent in enforcing such 
restrictions, including reliance on local official cooperation, a lack of willingness to comply generally 
resulted in the continuation of the old commercial systems. 
 
UNCERTAIN BOUNDARIES 
Disagreements arose regularly as a result of the continued use of pre-colonial commercial networks. 
Constant boundary disputes between various local rulers complicated determinations regarding 
jurisdiction or trading rights. The terrain of the Bombay Presidency was a patchwork, such that British-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 “Cotton and Customs,” Revenue Department, National Archives of India, (1866). 
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controlled territories were divided and interspersed with independent or subsidiary territories, each of 
which was managed by a different ruler and had a different set of agreements with the Bombay 
authorities. As in the case of salt production in Baroda, many of the rights claimed by the British in 
Gujarat were based on the notion that such authority had been inherited from the Peshwa through the 
Treaty of Bassein of 1802. Such issues, therefore, were often decided in debates over the extent to 
which the Peshwa had actually exercised authority over that particular item. It was often a subjective 
matter for interpretation whether a particular state maintained its right to cultivate or trade in a 
particular commodity. Boundaries between states themselves also remained ambiguous in this period. 
With the rightful ruler varying sometimes between neighbouring villages, and villages frequently 
changing hands, there was no definitive political map. Thus, with the laws governing the right to 
cultivate or move goods remaining a matter for debate, and the territories within which those rights 
could be exercised being ill-defined, the process of identifying and prosecuting smugglers was a 
challenge.   
Figure 1:  This map depicts the region of western India including the Pitlad Territories and the Kaira 
Collectorate (part of the Bombay Presidency). The Pitlad Territories belonged to Baroda but were 
separated from the main state by lands belonging to the British and other native rulers. The lands 
belonging to Baroda are outlined in green, while those belonging to the Presidency are outlined in 
pink. On the left, surrounded by yellow, is Cambay. This map was drawn by a colonial official for use 
during a smuggling case.  Source: Revenue Department Papers, 1851. 
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This problem is exemplified by the smuggling cases that occurred within and surrounding the 
Pitlad Territories (see Figure 1). By the mid-nineteenth century, the British had a treaty with the 
Gaekwar of Baroda that permitted him to cultivate, transport, and sell opium within the boundaries of 
his own lands. Pitlad held some of Baroda's most lucrative opium-producing lands but, as Lieutenant 
Battye, the Assistant Resident for Baroda, once remarked, the “Town of Pitlad is so nearly surrounded 
by British territory that it is almost impossible for opium grown in the Gaekwar Villages...to be 
conveyed from the town without passing through our villages.” 34  Consequently, even though 
movement of opium within Baroda was entirely legal – including the movement of opium from Pitlad to 
the rest of Baroda – it was costly and inefficient to do so without crossing colonial lands, an act that 
was illegal without a pass. Baroda merchants wishing to conduct such a shipment were therefore 
faced with the choice of taking the inefficient, long route to move their goods without leaving Baroda, 
purchasing an expensive pass granting them legal passage through British territory, or moving their 
product illegally. Unsurprisingly, many traders opted to forego the pass, instead illegally crossing the 
territories of the Bombay Presidency, using traditional off-road, inter-village routes.  
With jurisdiction questionable and the relevant policies themselves vague and contradictory,35 
prosecution of smugglers was heavily reliant on personal testimonies. The very identification of a 
transaction as illegal was dependent on the verbal accounts of those directly involved, most of whom 
had a vested interest in the outcome. The merchants had the value of the cargo itself at stake, which 
often represented a considerable financial investment. They also risked imprisonment or heavy fines if 
found guilty of smuggling. Meanwhile, local officials were typically rewarded with a portion of any 
seized goods, giving them a monetary incentive to ensure that seized cargo was officially labelled as 
illegal. Such interests certainly coloured testimonies, leading to accounts of events often differing 
greatly between the two sides of the debate, and even between parties on the same side.  
Debates of this kind became the cornerstone of the British fight against smuggling. There was 
ultimately a great deal of ambiguity inherent in the process of suppressing it. In order to deter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Lieutenant M. Battye to H.E. Goldsmid, “Question of permission to His Highness the Gaekwar to convey opium from Pitlad 
to Baroda,” Revenue Department, Maharashtra State Archives, (7 June, 1853). 
35 Demonstrating the contradictory nature of opium policies in Gujarat, A.K. Forbes to B.H. Ellis. “Cultivation of Opium,” 
Revenue Department, Maharashtra State Archives, (20 September, 1859) notes that “the prohibition of the cultivation of 
opium in Kathiawar appears to have been merely incidental,” going on to explain that a law passed to such effect had been 
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smugglers the authorities in Bombay first needed a definitive system for defining particular activities as 
illegal: this was something they severely lacked. Local officials would seize cargo suspected of being 
smuggled and detain those found with it, until they could prove one way or the other that the goods 
had, in fact, been acquired or shipped illegally. In one 1849 case (see Figure 2), three carts of opium 
were seized by local officials of the Kaira Collectorate, a territory of the Bombay Presidency. The carts 
had been loaded in the Baroda village of Bhadun and were in transit between Bhaduren and Padra 
Durrapura, also of Baroda, when they were captured. The carts were detained in a heavily wooded 
area that lay not only between these villages of the Baroda territory, but also along a narrow stretch of 
colonial land. In this area, the stretch of woodland belonging to the Kaira Collectorate was only 250 
metres wide. While the traders claimed they had been legitimately transporting goods within Baroda 
and were therefore seized illegally within the jungles of Bhaden, the colonial officials maintained that 
the carts had been taken inside the boundaries of the colonial village of Kherasa.  
Figure 2: The map exhibited to the right shows the lands where the 1849 case took place. This map 
also depicts the off-road, village-to-village routes commonly taken by local merchants, including the 
one allegedly being used by the carts in question.   Source: Revenue Department Papers, 1849. 
 
The case thus spawned a heated and lengthy debate, the main purpose of which was to 
determine on which side of the boundary the carts had been located when they were caught. The 
carts afterall had been seized in the middle of the night, with none to witness the event except the 
merchants themselves and the officials present. It was therefore purely on them that the burden of 
proof was laid, with testimony from all parties being considered. As a result, the circumstances 
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surrounding the seizure were hazy, as was the legality of those actions taken by the colonial agents. 
Khara Parsing, a Hindu sepoy with the coolie police stationed nearby, testified that he and an 
associate, acting on a tip that opium was due to be taken from Bhaden to Baroda, "captured this 
opium...there is no road going from Bhaden to Baroda without passing through the limits of Kherasa. 
The man that gave me this information, I do not know his name."36 The Collector of Kaira similarly 
asserted - based on the reports of his subordinates, not on personal experience - that the opium was 
clearly intended to be smuggled as it was "concealed under a quantity of rice - and the carts laden 
with such valuable commodity travelling during the night can leave no doubt of the intention of the 
parties."37 Meanwhile, the accused filed their own petition, asserting that the opium had been seized 
while legally within the boundaries of Baroda lands, and had been conveyed in such a manner in order 
to protect it from theft, with no malevolent intent.38 
Besides the immediate consequences of this case, the wider debate that it represented meant 
that both the Gaekwar of Baroda and the Government of Bombay were soon involved. The Gaekwar 
petitioned the British himself, identifying the opium as the property of the Baroda state and having 
been legally transported from one part of the state's territories to another. His further request for free 
passage for Pitlad opium through the Kherasa lands was denied, as the British Collector determined 
that such an allowance was "likely to cause an inconvenient precedent," and would "no doubt tend to 
encourage smuggling of opium into our territory, which already prevails to a large extent."39 It was 
determined in this case that the carts had been taken legitimately, within the boundaries of the 
Kherasa territory, and so were guilty of carrying their goods illegally across British borders. However, 
the statements given above, as well as the lack of concrete evidence to support such a decision, 
suggest that the determination was made in no small part as a means of maintaining the fragile status 
quo in the region. If it had been acknowledged that the opium had been seized on Baroda lands, or 
that the officials had practiced any impropriety in their handling of the case, the British would have had 
to question the existing legal framework or concede limits to their authority in such a matter. Moreover, 
the arbitrariness of this decision, and its overall reliance on testimony, points to the fact that activity 	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was labelled as illicit largely as a result of legal pragmatism and a desire to maintain the illusion of 
British authority over such matters. 
 
LARGE-SCALE SMUGGLING 
As these examples demonstrate, what the Government in Bombay referred to as smuggling was, in 
many instances, simply a re-labelling of established pre-colonial networks and trade practices. Most 
cases, in reality, were not deliberately subversive. However, there were certainly exceptions, with 
some activity being clearly and intentionally illegal. The profit potential of the trade with China attracted 
merchants from all over India. It was impossible for any merchants operating at the time to ignore the 
fact that China offered the greatest potential rewards. Many of those who had previously focused their 
business on the sale of goods to western Asia had redirected their attention toward China by the 
1820s. Though some such merchants migrated to Bombay and other colonial commercial centres to 
pursue their interests within the legal boundaries of the East India Company, others maintained pre-
existing habits, and used prevailing networks to operate in this new commercial sector. In one case, a 
well-known, successful Bombay-based Marwari merchant named Motichund Amechund, was caught 
transporting 1200 Bengal maunds (33,600lbs) of opium from Malwa to Karachi, demonstrating similar 
use of transportation routes and personnel – as well as a shared interest in unregulated profits – 
between those operating primarily through ports such as Cambay, Diu, and Karachi, and legitimate 
traders working from Bombay.40 Motichund Amechund was a prominent member of Bombay business 
society – one of the so-called 'Merchant Princes' – who benefited greatly from the booming trade with 
China. However, it is clear that such traders did not completely cut contact with existing mercantile 
links throughout western India, but rather diversified and adapted, just as had been the practice for 
centuries. 
Karachi was a particularly busy port for smuggling. The route between Karachi and the 
Portuguese ports of Goa, Damaun, and Diu remained in heavy use until the mid-nineteenth century. 
For most of its history, Karachi had flourished in the transhipment of goods to western Asia and Africa, 
but by the end of the eighteenth century its exports were largely intended for the China market. In fact, 
until the annexation of Sindh in 1843, Karachi was perhaps the largest single shipping point for 
independently exported goods destined for China. From Karachi, goods – mainly opium – were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Deputy Collector of Customs, Digest of Intelligence, Maharashtra State Archives, (Karachi: 25 December 1852). 
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shipped along the coast southward to Damaun and Diu. Captain John Shepherd reported to 
Government in 1830 that the Bombay Presidency's total exports of Company-controlled Malwa opium 
amounted to 3,566 chests while the amount shipped through Damaun – which largely, but not wholly, 
came via Karachi – amounted to 8,908 chests.41 Though the trade from Karachi was certainly 
substantial, in reality it was the perception of Karachi trade as posing a threat to British profits that had 
the greatest impact. Indeed, the Karachi route had become a source of enormous anxiety for the 
British, who saw it as seriously undermining their own opium revenues; Karachi, and the early threat it 
had apparently posed, remained at the forefront of smuggling-related rhetoric for many years after the 
annexation of Sindh halted much of the illicit trade.42  
While the illicit trade was certainly sizeable, it is questionable whether the trade ever reached 
the volume claimed by the British, especially since the Residents and Agents stationed in so-called 
smuggling ports often refuted the panicked reports made by the central government.43 Nevertheless, 
the very fact that it was perceived as a threat made it influential. Whether real or imagined, the idea of 
smuggling played a major role in the restructuring of trade in western India. British commercial 
interests were seen to be precarious and under constant threat from independent Indian 
entrepreneurship. In 1832, the Select Committee observed, “It must be recollected that the revenue 
thus derived is of the most precarious kind, depending as it does on a species of monopoly under 
which we possess exclusive control neither over the production or the consumption of the article”.44 
Anxieties over smuggling played a part in a number of political and territorial moves by the 
British in India during the first half of the nineteenth century. In the Karachi case, such concerns 
contributed heavily to the annexation of Sindh, which succeeded in finally bringing the Karachi-based 
opium trade under the control of the Bombay Presidency. However, prior to that, visions of an 
immense illicit trade flowing out of Karachi impacted heavily on policies concerning the setting of tariffs 
and transit duties. The pass duty on opium – one pass was required for the transport of every case, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 “Opium,” Dadabhai Naoroji Papers, National Archives of India, (undated). 
42  For example: From the Secretary to Government to the Resident at Baroda, “Letter No. 299-785,” Political Department, 
British Library, (19 October, 1874) on the subject of illegal salt manufactures in Baroda, “the illegal action of the [Baroda] 
Durbar causes a loss of Rs. 18,000 annually to the British Government.”; From Major G. LeGrand Jacob to H.E. Goldsmid, 
“Measures for the protection of the opium revenue at Bombay,” (Mandavi: 6 June 1853) states, “The longer the present 
undefined state of things, and circuitous channel of legitimate supply continue, the greater the loss to Government, and the 
danger of smuggling becoming the rooted practice of the country.” 
43 Major Hamerton to A. Malet, Customs Department, (Zanzibar, 30 June 1853); J.T.W. to the Government of India, “Salt 
Smuggling on the Pondicherry Boundary,” Foreign Department, (Pondicherry, December 1869); Dr. R. Brown to J.W. Edgar, 
“Alleged Munnipore Smuggling,” Foreign Department, (Munnipore, 18 September 1868). 
44 Report of the Select Committee, Judicial Department Records, Maharashtra State Archives, (1832). 
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140lbs, of opium – was kept deliberately low in order to discourage smuggling. The pass duty was 
fixed at 175 Rupees per chest for a great many years. In 1835, as a result of a perceived influx in 
smuggling from Karachi in relation to a diminished number of shipments exported from Bombay, the 
duty was lowered further to 125 Rupees per chest.45 It remained at this level until the annexation of 
Sindh in 1843. Immediately after the territory's annexation was finalised, the Government in Bombay 
considered it no longer necessary to keep the pass duty low. With Karachi now part of the Bombay 
Presidency, they were able to establish a formal political foothold in Karachi, with customs officers to 
monitor exports and ensure payment of transit duties. As a consequence, the price of a Government 
Pass increased dramatically and quickly. In October 1843, the pass duty was increased from 125 
Rupees to 200 Rupees per chest. By 1856, the price had reached 410 rupees, and by 1861 it was up 
to a staggering 600 Rupees per chest.46 
 Similar methods were employed elsewhere, with smuggling concerns likewise colouring policy 
decisions. As in the case of Sindh, the British attempted to extend their political presence in Kathiawar 
and Kutch as a deliberate means of preventing smuggling. Major General Sir John Malcolm remarked 
at one stage that he deemed the region to be “of much political importance” in large part due to its 
“flourishing seaport…and an alliance with it has enabled us to check in a very considerable degree the 
smuggling of Malwa Opium, which was carried on to a great extent.”47 While political influence and 
diplomatic relationships enabled the suppression, to a degree, of smuggling intended for export to 
China, it had little impact on domestic sales. The British determined that any efforts on their part to 
entirely suppress the cultivation of opium in Kathiawar would be futile, since its growth was 
widespread within Kathiawar and neighbouring territories. They recognised that an outright prohibition 
would likely result in increased smuggling activity, with the home cultivated drug simply replaced by 
that grown next door. Instead, they opted to employ price management as a means of discouraging 
smuggling, lowering prices of their own product in the hopes that local consumers and merchants 
would choose to purchase that instead. They decided, “we should content ourselves with discouraging 
the growth of opium in this Province by reducing the price of the Malwa Opium supplied from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 “Statement shewing the amount of Duty collected on Opium Passports from the year 1838/39 to 1848/49, made up to 1 
April and 1 October in each year,” Revenue Department, (10 May, 1849). 
46 Reports of the Commissioner of Customs, Department of Customs, Salt & Opium, (Bombay: Bombay Customs House, 
1856-1861); From E.L. Jenkins to A.D. Robertson, “Falling off in the price of opium,” (Bombay Customs House: 16 July, 
1861). 
47 Sir John Malcolm. “Papers on the Opium Trade,” Judicial Department Records (17 July, 1832). 
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Rajcote Warehouse." 48  On the advice of the Acting Political Agent in Kathiawar, they further 
determined to “call the agents of the Talookdars together, make them acquainted with the resolution of 
Government not to prohibit the growth of the drug, and call upon them to find themselves by some 
agreement…to prevent the exportation of the produce either by land or sea."49  With many of the chief 
cultivation grounds and smuggling ports lying outside the control of the Bombay Presidency, and with 
limited resources at their disposal, price management was generally the most cost-effective and 
diplomatic solution.  
 Yet, even this method was met with varying degrees of success. In Kathiawar and Kutch, as in 
so many other regions, opium was widely cultivated. Even with price management, unregulated 
products were frequently less expensive and easier to procure for local consumers. Moreover, with 
little assistance given by local chiefs to curtail the industry - some of whom actively profited from 
opium trafficking - reigning in the illicit trade was a nearly impossible task. Nevertheless, despite their 
general lack of success, the economic and political methods used for the protection of British customs 
revenues played a key role in shaping the political landscape of western India. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Western India was undoubtedly an active region for smuggling during the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century. The terrain itself and lack of well-defined boundaries between territories made it 
difficult to define and prosecute illegal trade. Prosecution of smuggling was heavily reliant on the 
cooperation of local officials and rulers, which was often not given. In some cases such cooperation 
was refused outright, while in others it was passively denied, with help given officially in speech or 
writing but not in reality.  
This region possessed a long-standing history of independent commerce, with Gujarati traders 
holding positions of power and financial might under the Mughals, the Marathas, and the Portuguese. 
From the latter eighteenth century onwards, they further built on these networks and patterns of trade, 
and even on their relationship with the Portuguese themselves, to circumvent British ports and 
continue their own extensive commercial activities. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 A.K. Forbes to H.L. Anderson, "Opium. Kathiawar. Cultivation of -.” 
49 Ibid. 
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With the increasing incorporation of Malwa opium into the British colonial revenue system from 
1818 - and later efforts made to extend this control over other commodities - it became more and more 
important to establish new parameters for legal trade. In so doing, British policy played a crucial role in 
marginalising certain commercial activities and thereby creating an illicit trade. This so-called illicit 
trade under the British, however, was in large part composed of pre-existing commercial system. 
Ultimately, it embodied a lack of ability on the part of the colonial government to bend or control the 
economy of Gujarat. With closer analysis of local smuggling activities, it is less a coordinated act of 
protest that emerges, but rather a widespread lack of compliance and a denial of the right of the 
colonial government to institute restrictions, especially in industries such as salt production that had 
long histories and deeply entrenched economies.  
The result was that a criminally subversive smuggling network existed more in the imperial 
imagination than in reality. Smuggling networks instead preserved long-standing Gujarati commercial 
traditions and epitomised both the opportunistic exploitation of ineffective enforcement processes and 
a refusal to re-mold commercial structures to serve British priorities. Illicit trade, in most cases, differed 
little in character from the historical trade of western India or even from the legitimate trade of Bombay 
Presidency; it was simply labelled as such as a result of new laws, shifting boundaries, and personal 
testimonies. While the illicit trade certainly posed a considerable threat to imperial profits, it was as a 
concept that it made its greatest impact: that dangerous and subversive network agonised over by the 
British was, at its core, merely a figment of their own perception. 
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